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“Is that the word ?” Samuel Beckett
and the Port-Royal Philosophy of
Language
Mélanie Foehn
1 For even should I hit upon the right pensum, somewhere in this churn of words at last, I
would still have to reconstitute the right lesson, unless of course the two are one and the
same, which obviously is not impossible either1.
 
Introduction: Traces of Jansenism in Ireland and
Beckett
2 Jansenism has long remained a disruptive theme in Ireland. Recently arguing against the
widespread  notion  that  Jansenism  had  been  imported  to  Ireland,  Thomas  O’Connor
defined  Jansenism  as  “a  complex,  multi-faceted  movement  within  early  modern
Catholicism that responded to fundamental challenges of contemporary experience of
religion2”, which thoroughly contributed to shape a nation’s history, memory, identity
and politics. The later connotations it received, however, had something of a negative
impact,  as  the  term itself  was  subject  to  misapprehension.  Generally  understood  by
Catholics  as  “a  heretical  movement  amply  warranting its  repeated condemnation by
Rome3” while “Protestant polemicists tended to view it as symptomatic of dysfunctional
Catholicism”, it was indeed dismissed by free-thinking scholars as a rigorist and rather
archaic derivative of Catholicism.
3 Historically, Jansenism was depicted and commonly understood as the very syndrome of
the  pervasive  moral  oppression which the  Irish people  had had to  endure  centuries
throughout, and had little, if nothing, to do with the doctrine and philosophy of Port-
Royal. Elements that illustrate this particular aspect are numerous. In a brief passage
from his study on Irish cultural life, evoking the “strange marital abstemiousness of the
Irish countryman and woman4”, Terence Brown had also recalled the negative impact the
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word had in Irish rural life. He illustrates this through the example of a stereotypical
discourse on rural Ireland in which the “abstemiousness was somehow attractive to a
Celtic people whose religious tradition had included masochistic excesses of penitential
zeal and whose mythology and imaginative literature had combined male solidarity with
heroic idealism5”.
4 The  very  word,  then,  was  closely  associated  with  the  idea  of  social  and  intellectual
paralysis, of strict religious morals and sexual repression, of an overall dreary, mirthless,
and  submissive  attitude  of  the  Irish  to  existence  in  the  face  of  historical  adversity.
Moreover, its widespread practice in terms of morals, gender relationships and religion
inexorably led to a sense of inferiority and frustration. Taking up elements of a previous
analysis, James M. Wilson points out that Jansenism moreover “signified Irish cultural as
well as political failure” to meet up with the advances of “other European cultures that
had entered with far less trauma onto the cosmopolitan riches of modernity6”. Within
artistic circles, the word likewise recalled the subservient condition of art, which itself
was prone, moreover, to failure because of its subsidiary status in Irish cultural life –
since nationalism and politics came foremost. Beckett’s articles on Irish poets and artists
underline their respective effort to either find a voice of their own, or conform instead to
the ideas of the Irish revival, displaying then “a rupture of the lines of communication”
between Irish art and European modernism7.
5 Samuel Beckett’s mentor and friend in Trinity College, T. B Rudmose-Brown, obviously
shared this defiance towards religious thought.  Rudmose-Brown is  depicted by James
Knowlson as a “highly unorthodox, even controversial figure8” who “interminably argued
about  religion9”,  was  “a  staunch  believer  in  individual  freedom10”,  and  who  “could
become apopleptic with rage when speaking about the increasing stranglehold that he
saw the Catholic Church exerting on the newly created Irish State11”. This belief found its
way  into  his  writings  and  lectures  on  17th century  French  literature.  In  an  essay,
Rudmose-Brown  fittingly  represented  Racine  as  a  fellow  free-thinker,  avoiding  to
mention the French dramatist’s complex relationship with Port-Royal12. He argued that
Racine shrewdly conformed to the social and religious conventions of his time only to
preserve himself from needless pressure and his art from censorship: “Racine is a very
great  poet.  He accepted the seventeenth century ideal  outwardly;  he may even have
believed he accepted it inwardly. But he was too great a poet to act upon it13”. Racine
then, was too exceptional a genius to allow religion to pervade or corrupt his art. Grace
McKingley’s 1931 lecture notes on Racine indicate that Beckett also thought Jansenism to
have only been incidental at one point upon Racine’s writing, as “[F]rom 1675 on, Racine
was losing his place in the court, so he may have gone back to Jansenism – faute de mieux –
knowing the precarious faith of the king”14, and also pointed out that Phèdre “is the first
play of Racine to bring in the sense of sin”, or at least “appears to be” so, the point being
that Racine states this same acknowledgement of sin as “a false awareness”, which is “the
final statement of the Racine invariable” where the tension between desire and the mind
culminates to an unprecedented intensity.
6 Rudmose-Brown (and Beckett for that matter) was no isolated example of this kind of
intellectual defiance towards the strictures of (loosely-defined) Jansenism, leading to a
reappraisal of the place of seemingly religious writers in the European canon. Efforts to
diminish the impact of Port-Royal upon authors of such unique genius as Racine and
Pascal were pervasive throughout the first decades of the twentieth century – not just in
a  specific  Irish  context.  In  France,  the  1923  celebration  of  Pascal’s  tricentenary
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heightened a general uneasiness before the very idea of his professed sympathy for the
Jansenist cause. Léon Brunschvicg and Maurice Blondel, amongst other foremost figures
of that time, endeavoured to find some kind of compromise (as others did with Racine),
and contended that what remained universal was his unique genius. Religion, then, would
just have been an occasion for both to write in an unforgettable idiom. Full acceptance of
both their attachment to Port-Royal only came later, after the late 1960’s, as growing
interest in Port-Royal’s philosophy, as well as its literary and spiritual repercussions in
the 17th century became a vast terrain for scholarly research.
7 On the other hand, the corresponding themes of solitude and withdrawal, of defiance
towards  authority  and  intellectual  commitment  to  a  given  cause,  were  also  closely
connected with Port-Royal’s  solitaires,  mainly through the figure of Pascal,  something
which certainly appealed to Beckett, just as Pascal’s questioning of inherited forms of
language  did15.  Indeed,  Pascal  wrote  against  the  tedious  and  pompous  rhetoric  of
scholastic treatises, advocating a style that would ideally respect an essential prerogative:
“Il faut de l’agréable et du réel, mais il faut que cet agréable soit lui-même pris du vrai16.” Pascal’s
prose  was  admired and deemed unique for  its  brevity and clarity,  and its  haunting,
syncopated and somewhat musical rhythm through repetition – as mainly illustrated in
the Pensées. The Letters also encountered universal praise; in Port-Royal (1840-59), the work
he dedicated most of his life to, still considered by many scholars as an invaluable source
of information17, Sainte-Beuve considered it to be Pascal’s true masterpiece – he quoted
and approved Voltaire’s  phrase  (“toutes  les  sortes  d’éloquence  y  sont  renfermées18”),  and
retained the idea that the work was unsurpassed in its brilliant display of all the forms of
rhetorical virtuosity in the French language19.
8 Beckett  had  read  passages  from  Sainte-Beuve’s  Port-Royal  at  TCD,  and  although  his
reticence to give sources has often been underlined, there is also evidence that he knew
about  the  Logic  of  Port-Royal  and  its  impact  upon  religious  doctrine.  Accordingly,
Arnauld and Nicole’s La Logique ou l’Art de Penser (1662) has often been mentioned for its
likely appeal on Beckett, and critics such as Frederick N. Smith have even argued that
Beckett’s  literary  achievement  could  not  be  fully  understood  without  the  formalist
description of language in the Logique20.
9 Thus,  Beckett’s  knowledge  of,  and engagement  with  the  three  major  components  of
cultural Jansenism in the 17th century – the drama of Racine, the philosophy of Pascal and
the logic of Port-Royal – cannot be disputed. My main concern in this essay, however, will
be with the second of these, and more specifically with the vision and prose informing the
Pensées or the Lettres Provinciales21. In particular I wish to confront Pascal’s reflections on
language with the interrogations which the reluctant choice of words leads to in Malone 
Dies, and consider the way in which the attitude towards language at once embraces and
rejects the principles Pascal had laid out in his early works. In doing so, I will try and
explain the reasons why Beckett, the arch agnostic, may have found in Pascal’s work, and
Jansenism at large, a paradoxical source of liberation – explain, in other words, how some
of  Beckett’s  writings  could  espouse  the  philosophical  contours  of  Jansenism  while
simultaneously repudiating its religious tenets.
 
Pascal and the (in)validity of words
10 Although  Pascal’s  ideas  on  language  partly  grew  out  of  Descartes’  contention  that
mathematical reasoning should ideally be adopted in all other intellectual disciplines, he
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was keenly aware of man’s failure to achieve such a sublime goal. In De l’esprit géométrique,
he highlights the necessity, and difficulty, of arriving at consensus in language: insofar as
ordinary words are inherently deficient, their validity and quality must be questioned so
as to prevent the dispersal of meaning in signs, and the confusion that would follow. In
order to do this, Pascal establishes distinctive rules for a clear and articulated discourse,
relying on reason’s capacity to discern truth from error. He then evokes the aspects of an
ideal method in the art of thinking, consisting in the preliminary effort to define all the
words and then prove each proposition. This method, however, remains inaccessible to
man: “méthode encore plus éminente et plus accomplie, mais où les hommes ne sauraient jamais
arriver […] méthode absolument impossible22.”
11 This theoretical defiance against human language was partly compounded, however, by
Pascal’s  own controversial  use  of  language within the Port-Royal  circle  itself,  for  its
combative tenor was thought to be unorthodox in the discussion of matters pertaining to
religion. Thus, given that mockery and irony were excluded from the rhetorical canon
and thus condemned in the discussion of religious matters, the style of the Provinciales
letters  was  deemed (by  some)  “unchristian”  and its  inherent  vehemence and subtle,
relentless attack in the name of truth on moral duplicity, unsettling. Reasons for this
disapproval were twofold: firstly, according to Mère Angélique the all too frequent use of
“improper” and violent terms was, in many ways, an affront to the duty of silence and
withdrawal owned to God; and secondly, it might have been a source of amusement but
no way whatsoever towards conversion. As such, though serving a righteous cause, the
letters stirred needless agitation23.
12 Pascal’s early endeavour to create an idiom based on the Cartesian principles of clarity
and  order,  while  remaining  open  to  the  uncertainties  of  polemics  and  humour,  is
reflected in the Lettres Provinciales. Letters I and XI are perfect illustrations of the spirit of
geometry at work, and yet are no less remarkable for their subtle use of comedy to relate
the contemporary debate on grace. From the opening passage of the first letter, Montalte
evokes his utter ignorance of theological  matters and endeavours to see through the
situation,  first  telling his  correspondent  that  “je  ne  suis  détrompé que  d’hier24”.  In the
subsequent pages,  as he gains further insight into the matter,  the uselessness of  the
dispute is suggested by endless disagreements on the meaning of given words. Thus, the
entire articulation of the text (grâce suffisante, grâce efficace, pouvoir prochain) is composed
of  explicitly  delimited  moments,  succeeding  one  another  in  an  ample  movement  of
linguistic  discovery.  Montalte,  startled by the intricate subtleties  in the definition of
specific words he is presented with, comes to conclude that: “il n’y aurait pas grand péril à
le recevoir sans aucun sens, puisqu’il ne peut nuire que par le sens25.” From the initial surprise,
there arises a growing sense of incredulity and bewilderment before the unreality of the
situation Montalte is confronted to. At one point, he says that: “je ne dispute jamais du nom,
pourvu  qu’on  m’avertisse  du  sens  qu’on  lui  donne26”,  an  elementary  precaution  which
Arnauld’s adversaries have evidently neglected.
13 In order to invalidate the Jesuits’ attack on Arnauld, Pascal’s fundamental argument from
the onset  lies  in the distinction between the ordinary use of  words and the various
meanings these words have been endowed with – in the Lettres Provinciales, the diversity
of opinions amongst the Jesuits themselves is but another significant manifestation of a
somewhat overwhelming confusion which undermines the common stance they have
taken.  “Equivocal” terms are not only a mark of  the weakness of  language;  they are
subversive because of that inherent vacuity which allows concepts to be either invented
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or distorted.  As  Montalte  constantly discovers  new and unknown words,  he tells  his
friend that: “Jusques-là j’avais entendu les affaires, mais ce terme me jeta dans l’obscurité27.”
Montalte  eventually  underlines  the contradiction and lack of  judgement in using ill-
defined words, as this goes against one of the basic tenets laid down by Pascal in De l’esprit
géométrique: “Les définitions sont très libres, et elles ne sont jamais sujettes à être contredites; car
il n’y a rien de plus permis que de donner à une chose qu’on a clairement désignée le nom qu’on
voudra28.”
14 Although  this  principle  should  be  used  with  reasonable  caution,  insofar  as  endless
definitions would in the end only serve to undermine meaning – “Il faut seulement prendre
garde qu’on n’abuse pas de la liberté qu’on a d’imposer des noms, en donnant le même à deux
choses  différentes29”  –  Pascal  resorts  to  it  in  order  to  eliminate  the  possibility  of  his
adversary’s  point  of  view  being  rationally  justified.  Similarly,  after  evoking  various
possible sources of disagreement with his Jesuit opponents, Montalte eventually cries out:
“c’est se jouer de paroles de dire que vous êtes d’accord à cause de termes communs que vous usez,
quand vous êtes contraires dans le sens30.” What is implied here is that if such a contradictory
attitude  to  words  and  meaning  is  possible,  then  these  words  are  utterly  devoid  of
ontological stability.
15 Words are thus defined as a reduction of both meaning and reality even as this is the very
condition for the possibility of language and communication In order to facilitate speech,
the patterns of reality have been simplified by men: far from holding the universal reach
Descartes would have endowed it with31, language is approximate, and nominal choices
are necessarily arbitrary32.  In De l’esprit géométrique,  Pascal says that “ce n’est pas avoir
l’esprit juste que de confondre par des comparaisons si inégales la nature immuable des choses avec
leurs noms libres et volontaires, et dépendant du caprice des hommes qui les ont composés33”. 
 
On the (de)limitation of language in Malone Dies
16 Beckett’s closeness to Pascal resides in the principle that the disjunction between the
linguistic and ontological orders is a sign of the essential vacuity in language, the inferior
realm to which all things human pertain. Since nominal definitions describe the tension
of thought in the apprehension of things, no access to the nature of the objects of thought
per se, or to the essence of verbal references, is ultimately possible
17 Reflecting upon the nature of speech, the occasion that produces it, and the very moment
in which it is produced, Beckett came to consider, in ways not unlike Port-Royal, the gulf
between words and reality. That confusion should prevail upon the (Cartesian) endeavour
to  bestow  permanent  meaning  (“signification”)  upon  words  and  find  an  absolute
language  inspired  from  reason,  brings  about  further  correspondences  with  the
ontological stance towards language and style the writers of Port-Royal sought to develop
in their own time. Inasmuch as this ethical project is carried out in the early prose works
and indeed throughout Beckett’s writing career as a whole, studying the ways in which
(probable) reference to the Port-Royalist philosophy of language and Pascal’s influence
are  central  will  bring  about  possibilities  of  interpretation  that  go  beyond  linguistic
formalism.
18 A  revealing  aspect  in  that  respect  is  the  thematic  pattern  of  overwhelming
incomprehension, the irreducibility of the real to words, that pervades the prose and
indeed most of the drama. Watt, and Beckett’s later characters, clearly express a sense of
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alienation before habitual linguistic forms that seem to have been at one point imposed
upon them and either search for a more adequate language or yearn to reach silence
through the very exhaustion of words. Molloy, for instance, having (finally) broken away
from Lousse, seems to be alluding to Pascal’s insistence on axioms of order and incidence
in a proposition, when he muses on the fact that “[T]here are things from time to time, in
spite  of  everything,  that  impose  themselves  on the  understanding  with  the  force  of
axioms, for unknown reasons34”.
19 Malone,  on the other hand,  though striving to conform to “what  reason counsels35”,
comes  close  to  Pascal’s  own  endeavour  in  the  Provinciales,  as  one  of  his  constant
preoccupations is to find the right word. In Malone Dies the problem is first addressed in
terms of a tangible delimitation of language – Malone’s preliminary step is to define
succeeding moments of his reflection, by making a brief “inventory”, and specifying from
the onset, possibly in mock-recognition of the ineffectuality of Pascal’s esprit de finesse,
that his “desire is henceforward to be clear,  without being finical36”.  The ideal of  an
efficient discourse is immediately undermined by his “old quibbles”, when he says that
“[I]t is better to adopt the simplest explanation, even if it is not simple, even if it does not
explain very much”, and “at the last moment correct inadequacies”, which he never does
(or has time to). On finding a point (or points) of departure Malone at first is irresolute –
he is soon to point out that he is “back at [his] old aporetics” – and hence decides to
“speak of the things that are in my possessions”. Consequently the desire to follow the
principle of a clear and ordered discourse is immediately thwarted by an underlying,
contradictory impulse, for Malone eventually admits that “reason has not much hold on
me right now”. It is as though the wish to conform to the ideal of a rational language
were instantly impaired,  just  as  the four stories Malone had intended to tell  will  be
successively interrupted, and abandoned, the character having repeatedly failed to find
the expected enjoyment (divertissement) sought with the advent of each new story, as the
ongoing refrain (“what tedium”) clearly suggests. Malone’s principal dread is to linger on
something that might bring about meaning or an occasion for reasoning. Indeed, as he
recapitulates, much in the way of Pascal, his latest developments, he particularly insists
on  the  fact  “There  are  things  I  do  not  understand.  But  nothing  to  signify37”,  and
concludes that “I can go on” – at least temporarily.
20 The first story, interrupted by occasional digressions, is built up through contradiction.
The expressions that are used can be related to Pascal through the very choice of words.
In parallel fashion to Montalte’s quest for truth, Sapo’s quest for knowledge is doomed to
fail from the onset, for “Somewhere in this turmoil thought struggles on38” – hence, as
Malone emphatically puts it, the desire to “let it wreak its dying rage” on others. Sapo’s
yearning for  knowledge is  somewhat  contradicted by the fact  that  “He attended his
classes with his mind elsewhere39”. Just as his taste for mathematics, however, seems to
give him some kind of understanding of the real, so his interest in nature is held back
because of an incapacity to grasp things coherently: “he did not know how to look at all
these  things,  the  looks  he  rained  upon  them  taught  him  nothing  about  them40”.
Impervious to rational methods, and alienated from the real (and others) as he is, Sapo
still remains “tempted by the knowledge of these strange things” nature comprises, but
emphasis is mainly put on his state of enviable stupefaction. Such subtle displacements,
eventually leading to the destitution of metaphysics, seem to have become a constant
aesthetic pattern in Beckett’s own prose – albeit through the use of parody and humour.
Even  in  the  passages  that  most  clearly  refer  to  Cartesian  principles  we  find  that
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inescapable  Pascalian  sense  of  contingency  and  misery  that  undermines  the
characteristic,  formerly  inalterable  reliance  on  reason:  this  system  of  echoes,  built
throughout the entire work, finds one of its most significant forms in the impossibility to
define essence, echoing back to the Pensées:
He was sorry he had not learnt the art of thinking […] and sorry he could make no
meaning of the babel raging in his head, the doubts, desires, imaginings and dreads.
And  a  little  less  well  endowed  with  strength  and  courage  too  he  would  have
abandoned and despaired of ever knowing what manner of being he was, and how
he was going to live, and lived vanquished, blindly, in a mad world, in the midst of
strangers41.
21 Obviously,  there  are  in  this  passage  identifiable  expressions  that  refer  to  specific
Cartesian terms: phrases such as “manner of being”, for instance, imitate Descartes’ use
of scholastic definitions as he establishes the actual distinction between body and soul –
“modal distinction” being necessary to distinguish substance from manner42. Conformity
with the Cartesian principle of method is respected and taken up insofar as the shape of
language  and  discourse  is  concerned.  However,  the  confusion  that  arises  from  that
innermost incapacity or aversion to grasp the “first principles” of metaphysics enables
language to give different shapes to the void. Negativity only becomes positive in the
moment when that very incapacity or reluctance to approve the hypothesis deriving from
the cogito and its consequences is irrevocably ascertained. The “art of thinking”, with its
Cartesian overtones, undoubtedly hints at Port-Royal as well. What is undermined here is
the capacity to think adequately – allowing language to lapse into a form reminiscent of
Pascal’s  many  later  elaborations  on  man’s  disproportion.  Form  and  expression
consequently become primary, displaying the ontological insufficiency of words, even as
digression and hesitation are  deliberately  made to  replace the defining principles  of
order and clarity.
22 In the Pensées, Pascal’s fundamental argument is that the impossibility to affix meaning to
words reflects the absence of centre: multiplicity (diversité) is but another declination of
that inherent reality. The only solution for the individual seeking to establish his own
subjective identity in the unsteady multiplicity of being is to accept an approximate one,
because there always remains a discrepancy between the object of speech and the very
source  of  speech itself,  the  ‘I’  that  speaks.  The  prose  therefore  slips  into  a  form of
expression closer to Pascal, with the rejection of the very assets of Cartesian metaphysics,
and logic.
23 Characters, or voices in the trilogy are therefore incapable of reasoning “selon les lumières
naturelles”, and their efforts are the constant object of mockery. In his description of
Sapo’s temperament Malone says: “Nothing is less like me than this patient, reasonable
child, struggling all alone for years to shed a little light upon himself, avid of the least
gleam, a stranger to the joys of darkness.43”
 
Conclusion
24 The most striking element of  Pascal’s  prose and use of  the comic is  his  unforgiving,
mathematical precision in the demonstration he undertakes, leaving no alternative but
for his adversaries to yield, or persist in error. Crucially, the comic participates in an
aesthetic  of  imperfection,  characterized  by  a  systematizing  function  where  endless
listings of possibilities, pervasive paradoxes, digressions, and aporia, are combined with
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the use of parody to subdue the voice of reason and undermine the classical imperatives
of order and measure in a continuous exercise of impoverishment. Set in contrast with a
clear and demonstrative style, the discourse of the Jesuits is characterized by the lack of
coincidence between expression and meaning. If any connexions between Beckett’s prose
and the Lettres Provinciales were to be made, then, they would eventually reside in the
Jesuits’ use of words. As Malone knowingly says at one point, “Aesthetics are therefore on
my side, at least a certain kind of aesthetics”. All in all, the forms of discourse in Beckett’s
prose seem to  fall  short  from corresponding  to  Pascal’s  (early)  ideal  of  an  absolute
language, only to echo later with the Unnamable the (perhaps) more properly Jansenist
theme of the absent centre.
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ABSTRACTS
Because of its doctrinal rigorousness and emphasis on penitential zeal, the pressure exerted by
Catholicism in 1920’s and 1930’s Ireland has sometimes been likened to the growing influence of
Jansenism in late 17th century France. In that respect, the biography and works of Samuel Beckett
highlight  an interesting scholarly dilemma.  Although he went into a  life-long exile  precisely
because he resented the culturally stultifying atmosphere of the Irish Free State, and may have
found in the typically anti-religious stance of French intellectualism a confirmation of his own
defiance  against  religious  creeds,  his  early  interest  in  the  literary  and  philosophical
manifestations of French Jansenism somehow complexifies the issue. As this article will argue,
using  a  comparison  between  Pascal’s  Pensées and  Malone  Dies,  Beckett’s  own  brand  of
intellectualism seems to stand halfway between the fully antagonistic stance of the free thinker
and the unconditional acceptance of an imposed doctrine.
En raison de la rigueur doctrinaire et de l’accent mis sur le zèle pénitent, la pression exercée par
le  Catholicisme  dans  l’Irlande  des  années  1920  et  1930  a  parfois  été  assimilée  à  l’influence
grandissante du Jansénisme sur la France de la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle. De ce point de vue,
la  biographie  et  l’œuvre  de  Samuel  Beckett  présentent  des  ambiguïtés  qui  ne  sont  pas  sans
intérêt pour le chercheur. Si son exil durable fut largement motivé par le malaise que lui causait
l’atmosphère  culturellement  étouffante  qui  régnait  à  l’époque  de  l’État  Libre,  et  s’il  a  très
probablement trouvé dans les positions traditionnellement anti-cléricales de l’intellectualisme à
la française une confirmation de sa méfiance envers les croyances religieuses, l’intérêt qu’il a très
tôt manifesté pour les productions littéraires et philosophiques du Jansénisme en France jette un
éclairage plus complexe sur la question. Comme cet article entend le démontrer, en s’appuyant
sur une comparaison entre les Pensées de Pascal et Malone Dies, la propre position intellectuelle de
Beckett  semble  se  situer  quelque  part  entre  le  point  de  vue  résolument  conflictuel  du  libre
penseur, et la soumission sans condition à une doctrine imposée.
INDEX
Mots-clés: philosophie - jansénistes, intellectuels, relations franco-irlandaises, Beckett Samuel
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